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## Afghanistan Situation Report

10 May 1983


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	KABUL ASSESSES	ITS POOR POSITION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE	25X
	January of the main in rural allowing forces he plandiscussions	ghan Communist Party Politburo memorandum drafted in late cites the "overwhelming lack of a military presence" as reason the regime has been unable to improve its control areas. The document blames party and state cadres for insurgents to regain control over some areas after armed ave withdrawn. To improve the situation, a new rected by a committee headed by President Karmalordered forces to expand regime control and party and secret consolidate it in the countryside.	25x
	gained, security	nt: Although recognizing the necessity of establishing security in an area before political control can be the memorandum offers no real way to achieve this. The largely ineffective and understrength regular rmy units are needed for offensive combat operations and	
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cannot be spared to permanently garrison areas. Police, Defense	_
of the Revolution, and Border Troop units as well as KHAD officers probably will now be given more responsibility to maintain control in the countryside. Kabul, however, has done little so far to improve these poorly armed, manned, trained, and motivated units. Insurgents will continue to reassert control	,
and drive out or kill government cadres in many rural areas.	25X1 · 25X1
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING DIFFICULTIES	25X1
Kabul has shelved its multiyear development plan and is attempting an annual one, but disruptions caused by the insurgency continue to frustrate the planning process,	25X1 25X1
The Afghan Government has slated about 80 percent of the power budget largely for three major projects in the Kabul area: a gas turbine from a Swiss company, which is scheduled for installation north of Kabul; continuing construction of a training facility for Electricity and Power Ministry employees; and establishment of a power pole fabrication plant. Other projects are mostly grid improvements for the cities of Qandahar, Herat, Balkh, and	25X1
Comment: Although the Afghan Government has signed agreements, mostly with the Soviet Union and bloc countries, which would have provided sufficient capital for the multiyear plan, two major economic problems have hampered project implementation. First, foreign funds were misallocated because of the incompetence of Afghan civil servants. Second, internally generated revenues were well below expected levels because of the insurgency. Moreover, the completion of projects for the power	25X1
sector in particular will be foiled by increasing insurgent attacks on power facilities and lines, which are already resulting in blackouts in Kabul.	.⁄ 25X1
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IN BRI	EF
	Kabul has expelled a US diplomatSecond Secretary Peter
,	Grahamfor the first time; prevented three Indian employees of
r	the US Embassy from returning to their jobs from India; and probably arrested three more Afghan employees.
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Jamiat Islami chief Rabbani and Hiz announced that they will be moving the Afghanistan within the next two months says that he will remain in Pakistan.	ir headquarters to , but Hizbi chief Gulbuddin
have made the announcement in anticipa restrict their activities in Peshawar, better control of their insurgent grou	and in order to gain
A US journalist who recently spent reports that insurgent morale and coop food supplies are ample.	

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PERSPECTIVE	
THE WAR IN CENTRAL AFGHANISTAN	25X
	25X
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Central Afghanistan has not been a major Soviet priority be its geographic isolation and sparse population. Nonetheless,	
is important because the insurgents there are the main recipie	nts of
Iranian aid. The area also contains a de facto insurgent gove confederation led by Ali Behishti.	<b>rnmenta</b> 25X
Background	
Central Afghanistan, an area known as the Hazarajat, is the about one million Shia Hazaras and small numbers of other ethn	
The Hazarajat centers on Oruzgan, Ghowr, and Bamian Provinces,	and
includes the border areas of eight neighboring provinces. The the Hazara area is poor, and traditionally food has been impor	ted from
neighboring provinces. The Hazarajat's rugged, mountainous te primitive dirt roads make access difficult; even before the Co coup in 1978, Kabul's presence was minimal.	
The Hazaras are the least prestigious ethnic group in Afgha because of their Shia religion and Oriental ancestry. Urban H for example, often hold menial jobs. Traditional discriminati	azaras, on by the
Sunni majority has reinforced the Hazaras' tendency to regard Iran favorably.	<b>Shiite</b> 25X
The Soviet Strategy and Presence	
Soviet/Afghan units penetrated the central Hazarajat in for 1980 but made no serious attempt to establish their authority the area, presumably believing that the insurgent movements ar and along Afghanistan's borders were more important. Since th Soviet/Afghan forces have largely limited their presence to ga Bamian in Bamian Province and Chaghcharan in Ghowr Province.	throughout ound Kabul en, rrisons in In Ghazni
Province, they have concentrated on guarding the key Kabul-Qan road. The ground operations in other adjoining provinces have	taken
place largely in non-Hazara areas.	25X
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The Main Resistance Movements		
The Hazarajat insurgents suffer fro traditional leaders, often from landow	ning families, and pro-Iranian,	
fundamentalist religious leaders, who During 1980-81, the traditional leader early 1982 the Revolutionary Guards be	s held the upper hand, but in	•
nilitary aid exclusively to the fundam traditionalist group is the Shora-i-It (slamic Revolution). It is the larges	ifaq Islami (United Council of the	
approximately 5,000 to 10,000 armed me federation of more than 30 groups and does have a recognized leader, Ali Beh	mbers. Although the Shora is a not a centralized organization. it	25X1
does have a recognized reader, All Ben	Ishti.	20/(1
The Shora collects taxes and admini- public works projects such as road buil- Young men serve one year, and older me confrontations with Soviet/DRA forces beasants appear to find the forced lab	lding, and a military draft. on periodically serve during and Iranian allied groups. Hazara oor projects to be the most	25V1
burdensome duty, an indication of the	low level of actual fighting.	25X1 25X1
		25X1
Behishti's main ally is Syed Mohamm	and Hagan Isalan tiba is native	
benisher s main arry is syed nonami	referred to as the Shora's "Defense	
just north of Ghazni City and who is r		
just north of Ghazni City and who is multiple of the Shora was crucial during recent		
Minister." Jaglan has several thousar of the Shora was crucial during recent		25X1
Minister." Jaglan has several thousar of the Shora was crucial during recent		
Minister." Jaglan has several thousar	armed confrontations with Iranian	
Minister." Jaglan has several thousar of the Shora was crucial during recent allied groups.  Both Behishti and Jaglan have a lin	armed confrontations with Iranian  nited understanding of the ne Hazarajat and the rest of	
Minister." Jaglan has several thousar of the Shora was crucial during recent allied groups.  Both Behishti and Jaglan have a limpolitical and military situation in the	armed confrontations with Iranian  nited understanding of the ne Hazarajat and the rest of	
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Minister." Jaglan has several thousar of the Shora was crucial during recent allied groups.  Both Behishti and Jaglan have a limpolitical and military situation in the	armed confrontations with Iranian  nited understanding of the ne Hazarajat and the rest of	

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discrimination.  Is still deep resentment against the Pus	there shtuns, and that there is little	
active cooperation between the Hazaras corders of the Hazarajat. Although the otherand the Pushtuns do not interference	and Pushtuns living on the two groups no longer fight each	
Hazara arms caravansthere is no coord haring of supplies.		
The Hazaras may also have to face the food supplies at some point.	e threat of seriously dwindling	
the Hazarajat is already producing		
pecause of migration to Kabul, Iran, and to signs of malnutrition, and the management of malnutrition, and the management of money available to Afghan nomade to government-controlled areas outside to all, in fact, limit food imports into	food supplies may be marginally es have reportedly made large s to buy grain and transport it of the Hazarajat. The Soviets	
ruthless campaign against the Afghan civ		

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